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We model the linkage between immigration of maids and intersectoral movements of female
family labor in a small open economy with a competitive factory sector and a household
sector which employs both immigrant maids and family labor. We show that relaxing
immigration restrictions on maids will not necessarily increase participation by family labor
in the formal workforce. We also show that reducing taxes on employment of maids will not
necessarily increase labor force participation by local women – instead, imposing a tax
(where there are none) may trigger such an increase depending on maids’ and locals’ relative
propensities to consume household sector output. Our analysis sheds light on one facet of the
penetration of the household sector by market forces and yields some unexpected policy
implications.
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Large scale movement of family labor, mainly female labor, from the household 
to the external labor market has been a feature of contemporary economic development
1.  
Another common feature has been the migration of maids from less developed countries 
into the relatively advanced world for the performance of domestic chores
2.  Not 
surprisingly, it can be conjectured that the two phenomena are interlinked.  This paper 
seeks to model this linkage. 
  Governments in host countries have sought to influence the migration process 
through a range of policy instruments, notably immigration restrictions and taxes on the 
employment of maids.  In this paper, we assume that the supply of migrating maids is 
primarily policy-determined:  their opportunity costs in their countries of origin are low 
enough to warrant this assumption over the relevant range.  The questions we pose are: 
1.  How do changes in the supply of maids to the household sector due to 
immigration policy affect the flow of local female labor from the domestic to the 
factory sector? 
2.  How would changes in the tax on their employment affect this flow? 
The answers to these questions would appear to be obvious.  Surely the inflow of 
more maids to take care of house-work could only liberate their hitherto house-bound 
mistresses to participate in the external labor market –  or so one thinks.  And, just as 
surely, a reduction in the tax on their hiring should have the same consequences. 
Not so, however.  A definitive answer turns out to depend on the properties of 
household production functions and demand functions.  Indeed, a reverse flow of local 
labor from factories to the household as a result of an increased supply of maids is not 
utterly implausible. As for a tax-cut, its impact is even more unpredictable, being closely 
linked to the relative values of specific demand parameters. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out our model 
and derive using comparative statics the impact of changes in immigration policy which 
affect the migration of maids.  Section 3 deals with the impact of taxes on employers of 
maids. In section 4, we discuss policy implications, while section 5 concludes with a 
discussion of related themes. 
 
2. The Model and Immigration Policy Changes 
We model a small open economy that produces two tradable goods in a competitive 
factory sector, and one non-traded good “meals” in a household sector.  The factory 
sector of the economy can be treated separately as a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
economy: it produces two goods under CRS production functions using two factors 
capital and labor, which are both freely mobile within the factory sector.  While capital K 
is not used outside the factory sector, it is not specific within the factory sector.  Both 
factory goods are produced and traded at world prices, which therefore determine wages 
                                                 
1 Young (1995) and Kim and Lau (1994) independently found that a major driving force in rapid East 
Asian growth was a large surge in formal, mainly female, labor force participation rates. Other researchers 
have documented the rise in female labor force participation in other countries (eg Greenwood et al (2005) 
for the US economy), sometimes after following a U shape (Goldin 1995). 
2 Cheo and Quah (2005) and Ghosh and Lien (2002), among others, document the widespread migration of 
domestic maids from relatively poor countries like the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, to richer 
countries like Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and the Middle East.  Pisani and Yoskowitz (2002) 
document the cross-border migration of Mexican maids to Texas. 
  1and rentals by the factor price equalization theorem. This fixes the return to capital and 
the wage of local labor which are fixed at r and w respectively.  Further, these factor 
prices are unaffected by changes in factory labor input due to migration from the 
household sector (at least as long as the factory sector remains incompletely specialized). 
  Since the relative prices of the traded goods are fixed, they can be considered as 
a Hicksian composite commodity and will be so considered for the rest of this paper.  The 
composite good is taken to be our numeraire. 
The household sector produces a single good, meals, using female family labor 
and maids.  The CRS household production function is 
(, ) H HH M L =                                          (1) 
where M is the input of maids and LH that of family labor.  This can be written 
() H HL h m =                                              (1a) 
where h is household output per unit of family labor and m the ratio of maid to family 
labor.  While both H and LH are endogenous to our model, M is policy determined for 
reasons already mentioned in the introduction, and can hence be treated as exogenous. 
  Local labor may be employed either in the household or in the factory sector.  
Labor employed in the factory sector is denoted by LF – another endogenous variable. 
The labor market clearing condition is  
L = LF + LH                                                       (2) 
Here L is the total local labor force, which is assumed to be constant : we abstract from 
population growth. 
Locals are identical in all respects, in tastes as well as in the ownership of equal 
shares of the capital stock K.  Their income per head comprises the fixed wage w and the 
return to capital per head rK/L.  Maids too are identical;  their income per head is simply 
their wage wm – endogenous to our model. 
  Maids and locals have different demand functions, though demands are in both 
cases functions of income and price.  The aggregate demand function for meals is the 
sum of the individual demand functions of maids and locals multiplied by their respective 
numbers: 
(, ) ( , m
rK
DL f w p M g wp )
L
=+ +                                  (3) 
where f and g are the demand functions for meals of locals and maids respectively, and p 
the price of meals.  While D is endogenous, we recall that w and r are exogenously 
determined by factor price equalization as described above. 
 The
 value of the marginal products of the respective workers in the household is 
equated to their wages in equilibrium: 
'( ) m wp h m = .                                                (4) 
w = p[h(m)-mh’(m)].                                  (5) 
The meals market clearing condition gives us 
H = D                                                         (6) 
Now equations (1) to (6) give us a system of six endogenous variables – H, LH, LF, D, wm 
and p – in six equations.  
We can eliminate p from equations (4) and (5) to express wm in terms of w: 
wm = wh’(m)/[h(m)-mh’(m)]                          (7) 
  2Our purpose below is to use comparative statics to trace the impact of an increase 
in M. We do this by examining the benchmark possibility that this increase be absorbed 
without any intersectoral migration in equilibrium
3. (We will see how the supply and 
demand for meals would be affected, were there no migration of local labor between 
sectors, and use this to draw inferences about the direction of migration necessary to 
restore equilibrium in the household sector). With no intersectoral migration, labor, as 
well as capital in the tradable goods sector, remain constant, as do relative commodity 
prices;  so do output and income from this sector.  In the household sector too, the 
allocation of family labor remains constant, and the only change is in the input of maid 
labor.  By differentiating (5) and (7), we can trace the consequences for prices and wages.  
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  We can now figure out the effect of increased migration of maids on the demand 
for household products.  Since the family’s income is independent of the number of 
maids, there is only a price effect on the demand from locals.  In considering the demand 
from maids, we make the assumption for now that maids spend their income locally (we 
will later consider the case where maids repatriate their earnings to their home countries). 
The maid’s demand is subject to both a positive price effect and a negative income effect 
since wm falls as M rises;  in addition, of course, there is the increased demand due 
simply to an increased number of maids: 
(, ) [ ]
m
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dw dD dp dp
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=+ + +                           (12) 
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3 That is, there should be no migration of family labor into or out of the household sector. 
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where εm is the maid’s income-elasticity of demand for meals, implying 
'( ) '( )
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where ηm and ηl are the Marshallian price-elasticities of demand for meals of maids and 
locals respectively. 





= .                                                       (14) 
Market equilibrium would be preserved after immigration without intersectoral 
movement of family labor if and only if dD/dM = dH/dM.  From (13) and (14), this 
implies 
*















                                  (15) 
The first term (in round brackets) in the numerator on the right hand side represents a 
price effect:  it comprises the price elasticities of demand for meals of  maids and locals 
weighted by their respective shares in the consumption of meals.  The second term 
captures the maid’s income elasticity of demand. The two terms have further weights.  
The price effect term is weighted by h’/(h’ – g), the ratio of the maid’s wage to the 
surplus of this wage over her consumption of meals,  the income effect term by – g/(h’ – 
g), the negative of the ratio of the maid’s consumption of meals to the surplus of her 
income over this consumption. 
  Migrating maids affect female labor force participation through two conflicting 
effects.  On the one hand, they increase the productivity of family labor in the household 
to an extent dependent on the complementarity between family labor and maids – a factor 
that attracts family labor back to the household.   On the other, they add to household 
output, depressing its price and tending to drive labor out to the factory.  The magnitude 
of the price change is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand.  Where maids 
spend their income locally, there is a third, and ambivalent, factor:  the increase in 
number of maids adds to their demand for meals, exerting upward pressure on their price,  
while the consequent decline in their incomes reduces their demand to an extent 
depending on their income-elasticity of demand.  σ* represents the balance of these 
conflicting forces. 
 If  σ > σ*, there would be excess supply of meals in the absence of intersectoral 
migration of family labor:  and this would drive family labor out of the home and into 
outside employment.  The distinct possibility persists however of σ < σ* – which would 
in fact induce a reverse migration of family labor back from the factory into the 
household.  This perverse situation could develop if maids and family labor are more 
complements than substitutes and if every one’s price elasticity of demand for meals is 
high and the maid’s income elasticity of demand low.  Then the immigration of maids 
would sharply raise the marginal product of family labor in the household;  price too 
would not fall much because relatively small price changes would induce large 
equilibriating changes in demand (while the reduction in maids’ per capita demand due to 
  4their falling wages is small).  Thus the value of the marginal product of family labor in 
the household would rise above the wage rate, luring labor back from the factory. 
We have assumed above that maids spend all their income locally.  If we go to the 
other extreme and assume that they repatriate all their income and do not therefore 
contribute to local demand, the demand for meals reduces to 
(,
rK
DL f w p )
L
=+  
and the condition for immigration of maids to stimulate an exodus of family labor to the 
factory boils down to
4
l σ η >  
If maids do not contribute to demand, the only factor of change in demand is the price 
effect on local consumption of meals.  Again, if the price elasticity of demand is large 
enough relative to the elasticity of substitution in household production, increased 





3. A Tax on Employers of Maids 
Now suppose a tax is imposed on employers of maids.  Let the tax rate φ  be such 
that  
(1 ) m ww r φ − >                                                      (16) 
Here  is the pre-tax wage of maids, defined in “(4)”, while is their reservation wage 
– the wage they could have earned in their own countries.  As long as (16) holds, no 
maids will exit as a result of the tax.  Moreover, since the supply of maids is perfectly 
inelastic, the employers of maids are able to pass on the full effects of the tax on to the 
maids by reducing the maids’ take-home pay by the full extent of the tax.  Therefore, the 
cost to employers remains the same.  The tax is borne by the maids and the tax revenue is 
paid back to locals in the form of a subsidy.  Therefore the effect of the tax is to transfer 
income from maids to locals.  This will impact the total demand for meals and therefore 
the relative price of meals p if the marginal propensities to consume food differ among 
maids and locals.  The absolute change in demand for meals due to this transfer is then 
m w r w
() () ( 1 ) lm m lm l d D cc w M cc s p H φ φ =− =− −                             (17) 
Here  and  represent the marginal propensities to consume food, for locals and maids 
respectively.  Now if we take the case of no intersectoral migration of family labor, then 
the transfer cannot have any price effects.  This is because no factors change in either the 
household or the factory sectors, therefore the relative price of food would also remain 
constant in a no-migration situation.  However, (17) shows that the transfer has an 
income effect on the demand for food.  If maids’ marginal propensity to consume food is 
higher than that of locals,  then demand for meals decreases so that an excess supply of 
meals emerges under no migration.  This will decrease p, pushing female family labor out 
of the household and into the factory sector.  Therefore, if 
l c m c
l cc m < , imposing a tax on 
                                                 
4 In deriving this condition we use the fact that in equilibrium, Lf=H. 
5 When maids spend a fraction of their incomes locally and repatriate the rest, the term showing maids’ 
demand in (3) should be multiplied by that fraction. 
  5employers of maids is another way of increasing female labor force participation rates.  
However this is subject to there being no minimum wage laws.  Had there been a law 
which prevented maids’ take-home pay from falling below the pre-tax level, for instance, 
employers would not be able to pass on the tax to maids and there would be no transfer 
from maids to locals. 
  If on the other hand, locals have a higher marginal propensity to consume food 
than do maids, imposing a tax would cause reverse migration and therefore should not be 
attempted by a government which wishes to increase female labor force participation 
rates.  This will certainly be the case if maids repatriate all their income, because in that 
case they do not contribute to local demand at all. 
4.  Policy Implications 
Our analysis has implications for governments which wish to increase (or otherwise 
affect) formal labor force participation rates, particularly women’s participation in the 
workforce.  If family labor and maids are more complements than substitutes in 
household production, if the price elasticity of demand for food (or other household 
services) is high and if maids’ income elasticity of demand is low, then a tightening of 
immigration quotas on maids might actually trigger a migration of family labor out of 
their homes into the formal labor force.  Otherwise, a relaxation of immigration quotas 
would achieve this.  Imposing a tax on employers of maids could increase their (the 
employers’) labor force participation rates if maids’ propensity to consume food is higher 
than that of locals.  If not, lowering such taxes would induce migration into the formal 
sector. 
An issue of concern may be that maids are a “discrete” quantity, in the sense that 
immigration policy can allow one more maid to enter, but not, say, half a maid.  We may 
then ask whether, for instance, relaxing immigration policy will work by allowing more 
households to import a maid, or by allowing one household to hire multiple maids.   
While both of these are possibilities, we can also talk about a third kind of policy, one in 
which the integer constraint does not create a problem.  Suppose the government can 
choose to restrict the hours of work that a maid may supply.  Restrictions on working 
hours are quite common.  Relaxing these restrictions would then have a similar effect in 
the analysis as relaxing immigration quotas – by shifting the supply curve for maid labor 
to the right - while tightening them would have the same effects as a tightening of quotas. 
 
5.  Conclusion : Related Themes and Possible Extensions 
Our focus in the present paper was on showing that changes in immigration policy or 
tax policy do not always affect female labor force participation in the direction which 
seems obvious a priori. 
This is related to a broader theme of the connection between female labor force 
participation and increasing penetration of the household sector by market forces. The 
work that women traditionally perform in their homes can now be “sourced” to, or at 
least shared by, imported labor (immigrant maids) or reduced by the use of labor-saving 
household gadgets.  Of the two forces mentioned above, the effect of labor-saving 
gadgets on female labor force participation in a small open labor-abundant economy has 
been theoretically modeled in Guha (2005) as well as empirically studied for a panel of 
East, South-east and South Asian countries in Guha (2006) while other authors have also 
modeled the role of labor-saving gadgets in freeing up women for work outside the home, 
  6and performed simulations for the US economy (Greenwood et al (2005), Albanesi and 
Olivetti (2005)).  
In this paper, we have used a model with a factory sector that behaves like a 
Heckscher-Ohlin economy (with two traded goods, two factors and factor price 
equalization). An alternative model might have a factory sector that exhibits complete 
specialization, in which case capital would become a specific factor and the factor price 
equalization theorem would not apply. Such a specification would entail modeling the 
factory sector to close the model.  Similar methods – of studying the effect on supply of, 
and demand for, the household good of a change in the number of maids when there is no 
intersectoral movement of family labor, and of drawing inferences about the direction of 
migration that would bring about market  equilibrium – could be applied to this model.  
Here too,  in the benchmark case of no intersectoral labor migration, all variables in the 
factory sector, its capital, labor, output, factor prices and income, remain constant, and 
the only change in the household sector is in the input of maids.  So we conjecture that 
the entire analysis of the present paper will carry through with identical results.    A 
rigorous proof of this conjecture is however a matter for future research. 
In the present paper, we have captured all the services traditionally performed in the 
household, in a single output, “meals”.  Therefore, we do not explicitly consider effects 
on fertility and childcare.  Two papers that are somewhat related in this respect are Ghosh 
and Lien (2002) and Cheo and Quah (2005).  The focus in both these papers is on 
outcomes for children.  Ghosh and Lien adapt the analysis in Galor and Weil (1996) to 
allow for the possibility of hiring immigrant maids.  This analysis is based on couples 
choosing fertility and working hours, assuming that each child requires a fixed number of 
hours for childcare.  Cheo and Quah (2005) concentrates on the impact on children’s 
educational outcomes of hiring domestic help.  It would be interesting to extend our work 
in this direction in the future. 
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